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Published in Singapore Law Gazette, 2015 March 
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Abstract 
The subject of non-delegable duty of care has troubled Judges and jurists alike. This article examines the 
recent Woodland case, where the UK Supreme Court attempted to provide a comprehensive and 
coherent legal framework. 
 
Scenario 
When tort law imposes upon a person (the employer or, perhaps more accurately, the principal)1 a duty of care, he 
may either perform that duty himself or engage another (a representative) to do it for him. In the latter situation, if the 
representative fails to act with care, the question arises whether the principal will be held liable for the 
representative’s negligence. 
On this issue, the main focus is on whether the representative is an employee or an independent contractor. If the 
representative is an employee, then the principal is liable, vicariously, to the victim for the tort of the employee if the 
tort was committed in the “course of employment”. If the representative is an independent contractor, assuming the 
principal had acted with care in the selection of the contractor, the principal bears no liability for the contractor’s 
negligence; the proper delegation of the duty to the contractor discharges the principal from his duty. 
However, there are situations where Courts have held that the principal’s duty to the victim is non-delegable and that 
where the representative acts without due care, the principal is in breach of his personal duty towards the victim. In 
the past, outside of the category of extra-hazardous activity, there was no unifying framework of principles or criteria 
to determine if the duty was non-delegable. In the UK Supreme Court decision of Woodland v Swimming Teachers 
Association and others,2 Lord Sumption JSC, who delivered the leading judgment, crafted such a framework. This 
article explains and comments on his lordship’s schematic, as well as on other perplexing questions in this area of 
law. 
Facts and Decisions 
The claimant, a student, was injured whilst attending swimming classes. Although swimming was part of the school 
curriculum, it was conducted not by the school directly, but through an independent contractor. One of the 
defendants3 was the school4 and, in this regard, the claimant’s submission was that the school owed her a non-
delegable duty of care to ensure her safety while she was attending swimming lessons. The trial Judge struck out the 
claim and the Court of Appeal, by a 2-1 majority, affirmed the trial Judge’s decision. 
On further appeal, the Supreme Court unanimously allowed the appeal and held, on the facts of the case, that the 
school owed the claimant a non-delegable duty and could have been in breach of that duty.5 
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Judgment of Lord Sumption 
Lord Sumption began by noting that, generally, liability in tort required a personal6 breach of duty by the defendant 
and was fault-based.7 The law ordinarily does not impose personal liability “for what others do or fail to do”.8 The “one 
true exception”9 to this rule is where vicarious liability applies. 
Then, turning to non-delegable duty, he observed10 that although English law did not provide a single theory to 
explain when or why non-delegable duties exist, two broad categories can be found. The first is where the defendant 
engaged a contractor to perform an “inherently hazardous” or “extra-hazardous” activity or operation; swimming 
instruction, he thought, was not such an activity. The second category, according to his lordship, has three critical 
characteristics: 
1. An antecedent relationship between the defendant and the claimant; 
2. A positive duty on the part of the defendant to protect a class of persons against a particular class of risks; and 
3. The duty is personal to the defendant, in that the work is delegable, but the duty remains with him. 
His lordship then surveyed the origins of the doctrine of non-delegable duty and considered various concepts used in 
the development of the law, such as assumption of responsibility, vulnerability and dependence, special relationship, 
protective custody, control and, even, “material increase in risk”,11 citing authorities from UK and Australia. 
Before setting out the appropriate legal framework, Lord Sumption reiterated12 that he was fully aware that non-
delegable duty is inconsistent with fault-based principles and is exceptional. There was, in his words, a need “to 
prevent the exception from eating up the rule”.13 He also remarked that the difference between an ordinary duty of 
care and a non-delegable duty must be more than a question of degree. In particular, whether a duty is delegable 
does not simply depend on the degree of risk involved in the activity. The ordinary principles of negligence already 
provide an appropriate response to the matter of risk – that is, the greater the risk, the higher the standard of care 
expected. 
He then declared14 that it was time to recognise the underlying principle identified by Lord Greene MR in Gold v 
Essex County Council15 and Denning LJ in Cassidy v Ministry of Health16 as well as the factors discussed in the 
Australian cases.17 
In Gold v Essex, Lord Greene had asserted the following broad principle of liability:18 
Once [the extent of the obligation assumed] is discovered, it follows of necessity that the person accused of a 
breach of the obligation cannot escape liability because he has employed another person, whether a servant 
or agent to discharge it on his behalf…. 
In a similar vein, in Cassidy, Denning LJ was of the view that hospital authorities are liable for the doctor’s negligence 
in treating the patient, and “[i]t does not matter whether the contract under which he was employed was a contract of 
service or a contract for services”.19 
Drawing from the underlying principle and Australian jurisprudence, Lord Sumption held that non-delegable duty is 
imposed where five defining features are present: 
1. The claimant is especially vulnerable or dependent on the protection of the defendant against the risk of injury; 
2. There is an antecedent relationship between the claimant and the defendant (independent of the negligent act or 
omission): 
a. which places the claimant in the custody, care or charge of the defendant; and 
b. from which one can impute to the defendant the assumption of a positive duty to protect the claimant from harm;20 
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3. The claimant has no control over whether the defendant performs his obligations personally or through employees 
or third parties; 
4. The defendant has delegated to a third party a function which is an integral part of the positive duty and the third 
party is exercising the defendant’s custody and care of and control over the defendant; and 
5. The third party has been negligent21 in the performance of the very function delegated to him and not just in some 
collateral respect. 
He also explained that while the defendant’s control over the claimant is essential, his control over the environment is 
not.22 
Lord Sumption then cautioned against imposing unreasonable financial burdens on those providing critical public 
services and said that a non-delegable duty should be imputed to schools only so far as it would be fair, just and 
reasonable to do so. However, he was confident that where the criteria of his framework are satisfied, the imposition 
of a non-delegable duty would not cast an unreasonable burden, and his reasons included23 the following: 
1. There is a long-standing policy of the law to protect the vulnerable and dependent persons and it is wholly 
reasonable that a school should be answerable for the careful exercise by its delegate; 
2. Parents entrust their children to a school in reliance of the school’s ability to look after them and have no influence 
over the arrangements that the school make in discharging its functions; 
3. The non-delegable duties of a school are not open-ended but are constrained by important limitations such as that 
the functions are ones for which the school had “assumed a duty”, and are performed generally in school hours and 
on school premises (extra-curricular activities outside school hours are not covered); and 
4. (Implicitly) the increase of outsourcing has necessitated closer judicial scrutiny of delegation. 
Applying his framework to the facts of the case, Lord Sumption concluded24 that the school owed the claimant a non-
delegable duty as it had assumed a positive duty of protective care and custody of the student, and the teaching of 
swimming, an integral part of the school’s function, and the control of the student were delegated to a contractor, who 
was negligent in performing that very function. 
In Singapore, Lord Sumption’s non-delegable duty framework was recently approved of and applied by the High 
Court in BNM v National University of Singapore.25 In that case, the estate of a deceased employee, who drowned 
whilst swimming at a pool belonging to his employer sued the employer26 in tort, and one of the issues was whether 
the employer’s duty to provide qualified lifeguards was delegable. Justice Quentin Loh found that most of the 
elements in Lord Sumption’s framework were missing in the case before him and hence the duty was delegable. 
Judgment of Baroness Hale 
Baroness Hale DPSC delivered a concurring judgment.27 She began by noting28 that while the common law is a 
dynamic instrument, its growth should not be unbridled and unprincipled. Rather, growth should proceed with caution, 
incrementally and consistently with some underlying principle. Also, distinctions drawn by the law should “make 
sense to ordinary people” and, to quote Lord Steyn in Frost v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police,29 should not 
produce an imbalance “which might perplex the man on the underground”. Looking at the case at hand, she felt that 
the public might well be perplexed if one student could sue her school for injuries sustained during a negligently 
conducted swimming lesson while another could not. 
Her ladyship illustrated by comparing, hypothetically, three 10-year-old girls  enrolled in different circumstances: the 
first in an expensive independent school which includes swimming in its services, the second in a large school run by 
a local education authority and having its own staff, including swimming teachers and life guards, and the third in 
state-funded faith (or mission) school which contracts with an independent service provider to provide swimming 
lessons and life guards. Yet all three students have the following features in common: 
1. They have to go to school; 
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2. They have to do as the teachers and staff say; 
3. Swimming is part of the curriculum; 
4. Neither they nor the parents have any control or choice about the arrangements for swimming lessons; and 
5. They need care and supervision for their safety. 
In the event of negligently caused injury, the first may sue the school for contractual liability, the second may sue the 
school on the ground of vicarious liability, while the third appears to have no claim against the school. And, it is 
implicit from Baroness Hale’s judgment that the public would be perplexed by such differing results. It is, therefore, 
necessary to make the school in the third situation liable and Baroness Hale provides the basis:30 
The reason why the … school is liable is that … the school has undertaken to teach the pupil, and that 
responsibility is not discharged simply by choosing apparently competent people to do it. The … school 
remains personally responsible to see that care is taken in doing it. 
She then agreed that the time had come to recognise the underlying principle identified by Lord Greene and Denning 
LJ and she fully endorsed the framework set forth by Lord Sumption. 
Baroness Hale also echoed Lord Sumption’s sentiment that the imposition of non-delegable duty under the new 
framework would not impose an unreasonable burden, adding:31 
It is particularly worth remembering that for the most part public authorities would have been vicariously liable 
to claimants who were harmed in this way until the advent of outsourcing of essential aspects of their 
functions. 
The above statement appears to suggest that outsourcing, as a means of side-stepping vicarious liability, is and 
should be frowned upon by the Courts. 
Finally, Baroness Hale considered32 Glanville Williams’ criticisms of the concept of non-delegable duty and, 
specifically, his policy arguments that contractors are often far wealthier than their employers and that the social evil 
of the occasional insolvent contractor is insufficient to justify the complications in the law. In her view, the arguments 
scarcely apply today where large organisations may well outsource their responsibilities to much poorer and 
uninsured or under-insured contractors. 
Comments on New Framework 
Lord Sumption’s framework essentially combined the underlying principle set forth by Lord Greene and Denning LJ 
with the factors laid down in recent Australian cases. It should be noted that the Judges in the Court of Appeal in 
the Woodland case itself had mentioned some of these factors or criteria.33 Laws LJ referred34 to “the acceptance of 
responsibility to take care of … persons who are particularly vulnerable or dependent” and the “duty to see that care 
is taken for the safety of a child or patient … receiving a service which is part of the institution’s mainstream function 
…”,35 while Kitchin LJ referred36 to the “special relationship” the essence of which are the “care, supervision and 
control of a vulnerable person”. 
Some comment on the above criteria and a comparison with concepts or terms used in the duty of care (“DOC”) and 
the vicarious liability (“VL”) structures respectively is in order here. 
First, as regards vulnerability and dependence, it is noted that there is some similarity in the DOC analysis where 
proximity can be found if there is a voluntary assumption of responsibility plus reliance or, controversially, 
dependence (as in White v Jones37). Note that the non-delegable duty ("NDD") framework requires a high degree or 
extent of vulnerability. The VL schematic does not have a similar requirement. 
Second, NDD requires an antecedent relationship, which is not a requirement in the DOC analysis although the 
presence of such a relationship would no doubt be relevant in establishing proximity and, thus, duty. Further, the 
relationship must be one which involves care, custody and control, which is more than what is required in the DOC 
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analysis. Also, the NDD framework envisages the assumption of a positive duty, whereas the DOC framework is 
wider and applies to both positive and negative duties.38 The VL framework has no equivalent concept, although the 
employer’s control over the delegate (and not over the victim) was one of the earlier tests used to ascertain if the 
latter is his employee. 
The third requirement – that the claimant has no control or influence over the arrangement which the defendant 
makes in relation to the relevant service – does not factor in the DOC analysis. However, if the claimant indeed had 
some control, this fact would be relevant if the defendant raises consent or contributory negligence as a defence. The 
requirement has not appeared in the VL structure. 
The fourth criterion – integral function – has no equivalence in the DOC structure, although it could be taken into 
account in the policy fair, just and reasonable stage. However, it does vaguely resemble the integration test for 
deciding if the delegate is an employee of the defendant for the purposes of vicarious liability. It would appear, then, 
that if the delegate was performing an integral function of the defendant, the defendant may be liable from both VL 
and NDD perspectives. Of course we can expect controversy and inconsistency as Judges struggle over the meaning 
and application of “integral function” in future cases where non-delegable duty is asserted. 
The fifth requirement – that the delegate was negligent in performing the very function that was delegated – is a 
rephrasing of the limitation that the defendant should not be liable for “collateral negligence”.39 In the negligence 
framework, this matter is probably dealt with under scope of duty, breach and perhaps causation. In the VL 
framework, the comparable concept is “‘course of employment” or its more recent variant – “close connection”.40 
Further, it is noted that in addition to the five criteria, Lord Sumption subjects the consideration to the test of fair, just 
and reasonable (“FJR”), as is done in the DOC analysis. Several questions arise here. The first is whether in view of 
the rigour and demands of the five criteria it is still necessary to consider FJR; one may argue that it is on account of 
FJR that a very tight framework is being crafted for ascertaining NDD. Another doubt is whether the FJR control 
mechanism is brought in only because the defendant is a public authority (or, at least, is providing public services). 
The context in which Lord Sumption made the assertion is ambiguous:41 
The courts should be sensitive about imposing unreasonable financial burdens on those providing critical 
public services. A non-delegable duty of care should be imputed to schools only so far as it would be fair, just 
and reasonable to do so. 
Finally, it seems the FJR analysis is to be done twice,42 once for DOC and another for NDD. One wonders if the 
repetition is necessary or useful. 
For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that Baroness Hale, at the beginning of her judgment,43 emphasised 
the importance of incrementalism in the development of tort law. One should also note that the new framework is a 
work-in-progress, as witness her reminder that “judicial statements are not to be treated as if they were statutes and 
can never be cast in stone”.44 
It is clear that both Lord Sumption and Baroness Hale intended to craft a legal framework with substantial restrictions 
or controls and, indeed, it would have to be exceptional before a Court finds that the duty was non-delegable. In 
particular, the criteria of antecedent relationship, positive duty and integral function are difficult hurdles to cross. In the 
writer’s view, the Supreme Court has not liberalised the ambit of non-delegable duty.  
On the contrary, it may be that judicially established categories of non-delegable duty45 other than those involving 
extra-hazardous activities,46 will now be subject to these criteria. If indeed these criteria are “defining features”,47 one 
would expect they have to be met. If so, then the ambit of non-delegable duties may even have been narrowed. 
Signals from the Supreme Court 
On a broader level, it appears the UK Supreme Court has sent out the following messages: 
1. Tort law (still) emphasises fault-based liability; 
2. Exceptions to this must be exceptional and need to be closely circumscribed; 
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3. Non-delegable duty needs and now has a coherent and calibrated legal framework; 
4. Outsourcing an essential/integral function generally does not insulate a defendant from liability;  
5. Non-delegable duty is personal in nature and is essentially different from vicarious liability; and 
6. Non-delegable duty is not strict liability;48 it is the duty to ensure that reasonable care is taken.49 
Questions and Doubts 
Ex facie, the UK Supreme Court has provided clarity which is much needed in this area of law. Nevertheless, difficult 
questions remain, including: 
1. Can non-delegable duty be used to hold an employer liable for an employee’s negligence where the elements of 
vicarious liability are not satisfied? 
2. Is agency analysis relevant to non-delegable duty? Can an independent contractor be considered an agent of the 
principal so that the contractor’s negligence is attributed to the principal? If so, what is the nature of the principal’s 
liability – primary or vicarious? Similarly, can an employee be regarded as the agent of the employer? 
3. As regards primary liability, why have courts hardly ever dealt with the issue of the principal’s duty, in requisite 
circumstances, to supervise his independent contractor? 
4. What is the principal’s liability for a representative who is neither an employee nor an independent contractor? 
5. Is it not possible that the general position should be that a duty of care is non-delegable and that a principal should 
bear liability when he asks another to perform a task for which the law attaches negligence liability?  
6. Are non-delegable duty and vicarious liability really different in nature? Is it time for an integration of these two 
concepts, which achieve the same practical result? 
While it is not appropriate or possible to explore the above weighty questions fully within the confines of this paper, 
the writer offers the following thoughts for the reader’s reflection. 
As regards question (1), on both principle and policy, it is difficult to see any sustainable objection50 to applying the 
non-delegable duty framework to a negligent act by an employee. Indeed, the statements of Lord Greene and 
Denning LJ suggest that the non-delegable duty analysis can be applied to liability for employees. 
The enquiries in (2) are more difficult. Even though agency analysis has hardly been used by Courts in dealing with 
torts, commentators acknowledge the relevance of the concept. Charlesworth & Percy on Negligence assert 
confidently:51 
Although a principal is liable for the negligence of an agent acting in the course of authority, as joint 
tortfeasors they are jointly and severally liable. [A] person who either authorises or procures another to 
commit a tort is equally responsible for the commission of that wrong, every bit as much as if he had 
committed it himself. In this way, if the principal gives the agent express or implied authority to commit some 
tortious act, the former will be held liable even though he may be the employer of an independent contractor. 
The passage suggests the following principles: 
1. A principal is liable for torts committed by his agent acting within the scope52 of the latter’s authority; 
2. A principal who procures or specifically authorises the agent to commit a tort has primary liability for the tort; 
3. Both the principal and the agent are liable as joint tortfeasors; and 
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4. The agent’s authority includes implied authority. 
In contrast, Markesinis & Deakin53 express this more generally and tentatively: 
[The principal] may authorise the commission of a tort, in which case he is liable as a joint tortfeasor along 
with the independent contractor. This is not vicarious liability. The main problem in such cases lies in deciding 
what constitutes authorisation. 
The following statement from Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency54 provides an interesting comparison: 
A principal is liable for the loss or injury caused by the tort of his agent, whether or not his servant, and if not 
his servant, whether or not he is called an independent contractor… (a) if the wrong was specifically 
instigated, authorised or ratified by the principal. 
All that can be said at this point of time is that agency jurisprudence, though large unutilised by Judges, provides a 
real alternative to both vicarious liability as well as non-delegable duty in analysing liability in this area of law. 
As regards question (3), the current judicial attitude is that either the principal has non-delegable duty and is primarily 
liable or, having been careful in his selection, is not at all liable for the contractor’s conduct. However, there is an 
intermediate zone of liability – there may be circumstances in which having delegated the task the principal retains a 
duty to supervise or oversee the contractor, such as where the contractor though qualified has limited 
experience55 or, as in BNM v National University of Singapore,56 where the principal had by clauses in the tender 
contract retained a considerable degree over the way the tenderer carried out its duties.57 
The query in (4) concerns a residual class of agents known as the “casual delegate”,58 whose tort may result in 
liability on the part of the principal. For example, a principal may entrust a task to someone who is neither an 
employee nor an independent contractor, such as a family member or a friend, who agrees gratuitously to perform 
the task. Is the principal liable for the representative’s negligence, and if so what is the basis? Non-delegable duty 
may not assist since the Woodland criteria are not easily satisfied. Would agency be the basis? 
In Alcock v Wraith & Others,59 Neill LJ catalogued seven situations of non-delegable duty: statutory duties that are 
cannot be delegated,60 withdrawal of support from neighbouring land, escape of fire, liability under the rule in Rylands 
v Fletcher, operations on highways, an employer’s duty of safety towards his employees61 and extra-hazardous 
activities. To all these will now be added other situations in which the Woodland criteria are satisfied. Little wonder 
then that Lord Sumption feared the exception might eat up the rule. 
This leads us to the more fundamental question raised in (5) above – can it not be that the general principle is that a 
duty of care is non-delegable? Is it not possible to treat Lord Greene’s proposition – that a person accused of a 
breach of the obligation cannot escape liability because he has employed another person, whether a servant or agent 
to discharge it on his behalf – as the general principle rather than the exception? From a benefit-responsibility 
perspective, this makes sense as the person who takes the benefit should also bear the responsbility, which is one of 
the arguments for imposing vicarious liability. A general principle of non-delegability could be subject to exceptions 
such as necessity, as where the principal lacks the special expertise to perform the task. The Courts could 
conceivably come up with other special circumstances in which it is fair, just and reasonable to allow delegation of the 
duty, including where the victim is aware of and consents to the delegation. 
It may be thought that a general position of non-delegable duty would be unduly harsh. However, this writer suggests 
a few reasons why this is not so and that the proposed position is in fact desirable. 
First, the imposition of non-delegable duty does not result in absolute liability. Non-delegable duty simply requires that 
care be taken, either by the principal himself or by his delegate. If despite care being taken by the delegate there is 
injury or damage to the victim, the principal bears no liability. The duty to ensure that care is taken is not an 
intolerably heavy one. 
Second, it is always open for the principal to come to an agreement with his delegate as to who should bear the 
responsibility for any injury negligently caused by the delegate. In fact, in the professional or commercial context, it 
would be most appropriate for the principal and the delegate to decide who should indemnify the other and to make 
the necessary insurance arrangements. 
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Third, elevating Lord Greene's proposition to the general position helps to address the difficulties in query (6). On this 
matter, it is observed that while Judges often strenuously emphasise that vicarious liability is different in nature from 
personal liability and that non-delegable duty is a form of personal liability, the reality is that both vicarious liability and 
non-delegable duty are ways by which the law imputes or attributes liability to the principal. It is no wonder that 
commentators have questioned if vicarious liability and non-delegable duty “share more than a functional 
equivalence”62 and that the time may have come for the integration63 (and re-naming)64 of the two concepts. The 
candour ofWinfield & Jolowicz on Torts65 is illuminating: 
It is not very clear why we are reluctant simply to say that there is a vicarious liability in these cases [of non-
delegable duty], for that seems to be the practical effect. To say, as we commonly do, that there is a duty to 
‘ensure that care is taken’ hardly distinguishes the case from ordinary vicarious liability… 
It is not suggested that the current position of delegability as the general principle and non-delegability as the 
exception is unworkable or unduly favourable to the defendant. After all, delegation is not a carte blanche – the law 
expects the principal to exercise due care in the selection of his delegate. Further, theoretically, the principal may, 
delegation notwithstanding, still have a (primary) duty to supervise (or to keep a check on) the delegate if the 
circumstances so require. The main attraction of reversing the general position is that it helps to unify vicarious 
liability and non-delegable duty and, perhaps, agency analysis as well. 
Concluding Remarks 
To be sure, the Woodland framework is a coherent and robust one and is a commendable and positive development 
in the law. After Woodland, there is now a detailed and rational framework which clearly sets out and carefully 
circumscribes the ambit of non-delegable duty. But other difficulties remain. 
As one steps back to take a more detached look at the labyrinth of law on the subject and the three applicable 
concepts – vicarious liability, non-delegable duty and agency – one cannot help but wonder if a more cohesive and 
comprehensive approach is needed. The solution may lie in the adoption of a general principle in tort law that when 
the law imposes on a person a duty to take care, that duty is not delegable. Of course, that would be a radical move. 
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Notes 
1 In case law, as well as literature on the subject of non-delegable duty, the term “employer” is often used, even 
where it is clear that the representative so engaged is an independent contractor and not an employee. To avoid this 
imprecision and its attendant confusion, the writer will use the term “principal” instead of “employer” even though it is 
somewhat unconventional to do so. 
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2 [2013] 3 WLR 1227. 
3 The other defendants were the Swimming Teachers Association (first defendant), the contractors Direct Swimming 
Services (second defendant), the lifeguard (third defendant) and the operator of the swimming pool (fifth defendant). 
The school was the fourth defendant. 
4 More accurately, Essex County Council – the local education authority having responsibility for the school. 
5 The case was, therefore, remitted to the High Court for an ascertainment of the relevant facts. 
6 At [3]. 
7 At [5]. 
8 At [5]. 
9 At [3]. 
10 At [6]. 
11 The “material increase in risk” concept, however, did not feature in the final formulation. 
12 At [22]. 
13 At [22]. 
14 At [23]. 
15 [1942] 2 KB 293, 301, CA. 
16 [1951] 2 KB 343, 362-363, CA. 
17 Namely, Commonwealth of Australia v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258, Kondis v State Transport Authority (1984) 
154 CLR 672, Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty (1994) 179 CLR 520 and New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 
212 CLR 511. 
18 [1942] 2 KB 293 at 301. 
19 [1951] 2 KB 342 at 362. 
20 And not just a duty to refrain from conduct which will foreseeably damage the defendant. 
21 To be comprehensive, perhaps this element should recite “the third party has been negligent or otherwise in 
breach of duty …”, bearing in mind that non-delegable duty is not confined to negligence scenarios. 
22 Differing from the view expressed by Lord Phillips MR in A (A Child) v Ministry of Defence [2005] QB 183 at [47]. 
23 Two other reasons were that publicly funded institutions should, in this regard, be treated similarly to privately 
funded institutions, whose responsibilities are non-delegable, and that whilst imposing non-delegable duty on schools 
results in putting greater responsibility on them than the law puts on parents, the comparison between the positions of 
the two classes of persons is not appropriate. Baroness Hale’s explanation (at [41]) of the latter point is more 
compelling: children rarely sue their parents not because the parents do not owe them a duty of care; rather it is 
because any damages recovered will normally reduce the resources available to cater for the needs of the child and 
her family. 
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24 At [26]. 
25 [2014] 2 SLR 258 at [56]-[62]; on appeal [2014] 4 SLR 931. Non-delegable duty was not discussed in the Court of 
Appeal. 
26 Hydro Aquatic Swimming School, the entity to whom the lifeguard services were outsourced, was the second 
defendant.  
27 The other members of the court – Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony, Lord Wilson and Lord Toulson JJSC – did not 
deliver separate judgments, but concurred with both Lord Sumption and Baroness Hale. 
28 At [28]. 
29 [1999] 2 AC 455 at 495. 
30 At [34]. 
31 At [40]. 
32 At [42]. 
33 [2012] PIQR 12, although the majority of the Court (Laws LJ dissenting) thought that non-delegable duty did not 
apply to the school in the instant case. 
34 At [30]. 
35 The term “mainstream function” was also referred to by Tomlinson LJ (at [33]), who was hesitant to impose non-
delegable duty on education authorities lest it produced a “chilling effect” on their willingness to provide valuable 
educational experiences. 
36 At [77]. 
37 [1995] 2 AC 207. 
38 Not to mention the different term “voluntary assumption of responsibility” for DOC. Note also the use of the term 
“acceptance” by Laws and Kitchin LLJ at [30] and [82] respectively. 
39 See paras [8] and [15] of Lord Sumption’s judgment. 
40 Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2002] 1 AC 215. 
41 At [25]. Not dissimilarly, in Skandinaviska v APB [2009] 4 SLR(R) 788, CJ Chan also added the requirement of 
“fair and just” and, in this regard, highlighted the importance of deterrence and victim compensation. 
42 Where the framework is applied to tort situations other than negligence (such as the rule in Rylands v Fletcher), it 
appears the FJR consideration is a new hurdle to be crossed when the tort is committed not by the principal himself 
but by his delegate. 
43 At [28]. 
44 At [38]. 
45 See Alcock v Wraith & Others (1991) 59 BLR 16 for Neill LJ’s list of seven situations of non-delegable duty, 
namely: statutory non-delegable duties, withdrawal of support from neighbouring land, escape of fire, rule in Rylands 
v Fletcher, operations on highways, employer’s duty of safety to employees and extra-hazardous activities. 
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46 Note that Lord Sumption, at [23], prefaced his recitation of the “defining features” with the words “[i]f the highway 
and hazard cases are put to one side”. Thus, the new framework should apply to the remaining five situations in Neill 
LJ’s catalogue. 
47 Per Lord Sumption in Woodland at [23]. 
48 Christian Witting, in “Breach of the Non-Delegable Duty: Defending Strict Liability in Tort” (2006) 29 UNSW Law 
Journal 33, asserted that non-delegable duty invariably involved the imposition of strict or absolute liability. He also 
asserted that non-delegable duty is an independent tort; the Woodland judgment does not give any support to such a 
view. It is submitted that non-delegable duty is a form of liability just as strict liability is a form of liability; it is not an 
independent tort. 
49 This is clear from Lord Sumption’s citing with approval a passage from Mason J’s judgment in Commonwealth of 
Australia v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258 at para 29-34, where there were two references (at para 29 and para 32) 
to “a duty to ensure that reasonable care was taken” and his conclusion (at [26]) that the school “assumed a duty to 
ensure that the claimant’s swimming lessons were carefully conducted … ” Note also Baroness Hale’s statement (at 
[33]) that “his duty was to see that whoever performed the duty …  did so without fault”. The duty to ensure that care 
is taken does not equate with strict or absolute liability: see John Murphy, “The Liability Bases of Common Law Non-
Delegable Duties – A Reply to Christian Witting” (2007) 30 UNSW Law Journal  1, 86. 
50 Apart from the discomfort in seeing that the application of two separate principles – vicarious liability and non-
delegable duty – to a scenario can produce contrasting results. But this happens often in different realms of law. 
51 12th ed, gen ed Walton, p 3-161. 
52 “Scope of authority” rather than “course of authority” was the term used by Lord Wilberforce in Heatons Transport 
(St Helens) Ltd v TGWU [1973] AC 15 at 99, whom Charlesworth & Percy cited. 
53 Markesinis & Deakin’s Tort Law (7th edition, OUP, 2013), p 583. 
54 Watts and Reynolds (19th edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 2010), pp 8-177. 
55 Another possible situation is where the principal, being a supporter of rehabilitation of offenders, knowingly awards 
the contract to a firm comprising ex-convicts. 
56 [2014] SGHC 05 at [72]-[74], and [100]. 
57 Although the defendant was found to be negligent in supervision, the claim failed on the ground of causation as 
the Court concluded (at [126]) that the (deceased) claimant would have drowned even if there had not been 
negligence since he had “severe underlying heart disease”. 
58 See eg Bowstead & Reynolds at 8-187. 
59 (1991) 59 BLR 16. 
60 Regulation 18B of the Financial Advisers Regulations (Cap 110, Rg 2, 2004 Rev Ed), introduced in July 2011, is a 
good example of a non-delegable statutory duty. The provision requires the senior management of a financial 
institution to ensure that due diligence is done in relation to the sale of financial products. On the controversies 
surrounding this provision, see KY Low, “Product Suitability, Due Diligence and Management Responsibility: The 
New Regime of Regulation 18B of the Financial Advisers Regulations” (2012) 24 S AcLJ 298. 
61 The non-delegability of an employer’s duty of safety to his employee was confirmed in the Singapore Court of 
Appeal in Chandran v Dockers Marine Pte Ltd [2010] 1 SLR 786. 
62 Lunney & Oliphant, Tort Law, Text and Materials (5th edition), p 843. 
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63 Deakin, Johnston & Markesinis, Markesinis & Deakin’s Tort Law (7th edition), pp 587-588.   
64 Vicarious liability and non-delegable duty can both be renamed “attributed liability”. Other possibilities include 
“imposed liability” or “deemed liability”. 
65 Rogers (ed),Winfield & Jolowicz on Torts (18th edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 2010), p 945. 
